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The Environment and Trade - A Multilateral Imperative
Geoffrey W. Levin
Environmental protection' has emerged as one of the most
pressing social issues of the last quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury. Environmental concern in developed and developing coun-
tries alike continues to evolve as the global impact of local
environmental adulteration becomes more evident.2 Notwith-
standing this recognition, economic and social interests often
subvert environmental concerns.3 In varying degree, developed
and developing countries tolerate environmentally hazardous
activities which lower production costs and provide a competi-
tive advantage in international trade.4
As one of the world's greatest polluters, the United States
1. Environmental protection encompasses both the conservation of ex-
isting natural resources and the restoration of environmental degradation, to
the extent possible. Persistent environmental concerns include protection of
wild flora and fauna; maintenance of air and water quality; preventing desertifi-
cation; and preservation of the atmospheric ozone layer. For a general analysis
of what constitutes the "environment" in the context of global environmental
problems see, KENNETH A. DAHLBERG ET AL., ENVIRONMENT AND THE GLOBAL
ARENA (1985); Review of the Environmental Situation and of Activities Relat-
ing to the Environment Programme, Report of the Executive Director, U.N.E.P.
3rd Sess., Agenda Item 7.0, at 20, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/30 (1975) [hereinafter
UNEP Review].
2. Recent Environmental Activities of the Agency for International De-
velopment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int Orgs. of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990) [hereinafter
Activities of the AID.] (statement of Richard E. Bissell, Assistant Administra-
tor, Bureau for Science and Technology, Agency for International
Development).
3. Many developing countries subjugate the environment to more basic
interests such as food and shelter. For example, countries permit the use of
slash and burn agriculture techniques, which are rapidly destroying the tropical
rain forests, in an attempt to gain arable agricultural land to meet the needs of
an ever-increasing third world population. Cf. Ingo Walter, International Eco-
nomic Repercussions of Environmental Policy: An Economist's Perspective, in
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLIcY 22, 23 (Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds.,
1982) (explaining that different countries approach environmental management
according to different schedules, with different degrees of rigor, and using dif-
ferent policy approaches).
4. 137 CONG. REC. S13169 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Baucus).
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recently has taken great strides and incurred substantial costs to
remedy the deleterious effects of its industrialization and to pre-
vent further environmental destruction.5 Other countries' fail-
ure to address their own industries' impact on the environment
and the perceived trade advantage this creates has led several
members of the U.S. Congress to call for inclusion of environ-
mental issues in the international trade regime.6
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) identified
at least thirty-three environmental bills introduced in the 101st
Congress that would restrict international trade or affect inter-
national trade policy.7 A number of bills directly linked export
or import restrictions with environmental policies.8 The 102d
Congress has renewed 9 and surpassed ° the 101st Congress's en-
deavors to condition trade on environmental protection. If
passed, this legislation would introduce environmental "condi-
5. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recently completed a study
which indicates that U.S. expenditures on environmental protection have
reached approximately $100 billion per year. This expenditure represents 1.5-
1.7% of the United States' gross national product and is expected to rise to
nearly 3% of the GNP within ten years. 137 CONG. REC. S5300 (daily ed. Apr.
25, 1991) (introduced as a finding of Congress under S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991)).
6. See, e.g., Id. at S5299 (daily ed. April 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Boren
cautioning that "[the United States] cannot afford to conduct its trade policy in
an environmental vacuum." The proposed Senate bill, S. 984, calls for Congress
to recognize explicitly that "[tihe significant and serious competitive advantage
enjoyed by our foreign competitors from cost savings derived from the absence
of effective pollution controls results in cheaper foreign imports which capture
U.S. market share and injure U.S. industries." S. 984. Id. See infra notes 121-
62 and accompanying text on proposed U.S. legislation.
7. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 2351, INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS TO PRoTEcT THE ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE 1-8 (1991) (Report to the
Senate Committee on Finance, on Investigation No. 332-287 under Section 332
of the Tariff Act of 1930) [hereinafter INT'L AGREEMENTS]. Most of these bills
were not enacted, however, either because other actions made them unneces-
sary (e.g., the president's ban on U.S. imports of ivory), or because voluntary
efforts were made on a bilateral and multilateral level (e.g., the Montreal Pro-
tocol on the phase out of CFCs). Id.
8. For instance, a number of bills would authorize the president to ban
imports from nations which disregard international fisheries conservation pro-
grams, or which conduct trade in elephant products. See infra notes 138-39 and
accompanying text.
9. S. 59 reintroduces provisions of S. 261, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989),
which would amend Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to make the failure to
protect the environment an unfair trade practice. S. 59, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
10. S. 984, which calls for countervailing duties on imported products from
countries with unsound environmental policies, provides the broadest state-
ment yet for environmental protection. See infra notes 143-47 and accompany-
ing text.
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tionality" by forcing trading partners of the United States to
comply with minimum environmental standards or risk trade
sanctions.
This Note contends that environmental conditionality
would be less effective than multilateral action in achieving U.S.
goals of fair trade and environmental protection. Part I outlines
the relationship between international trade and environmental
protection, and traces the history of environmental issues in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).12 Part II ex-
amines proposed U.S. legislation conditioning unfettered trade
access on minimum environmental standards and analyzes the
negative reaction these bills, if enacted, would probably elicit
from the international community (developed and developing
nations). Part III discusses the advantages of seeking environ-
mental protection through international cooperation and ex-
plains how multilateral action provides a viable and
internationally acceptable means of achieving Congress's moral,
political and economic objectives for which it has prefaced uni-
lateral action. This Note concludes that the U.S. Congress
should redirect its efforts toward establishing environmental
norms in a multilateral framework.
PART I. THE RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE TO THE ENVIRONMENT
Two interrelated concerns have propelled environmental is-
sues to the forefront of the international trade arena. Genuine
global concern for environmental protection is inducing econom-
ically and politically powerful nations to assert control over sov-
ereign countries' environmental priorities.13  Soaring
11. As used herein, environmental "conditionality" mandates a quid pro
quo, whereby trade access is allowed only to nations adopting specified environ-
mental standards.
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
13. GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment 16 (1992) (forthcoming
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990-1991, advance copy on file with the Minnesota
Journal of Global Trade) (hereinafter GATr, Trade and the Environment).
Governments are increasingly recognizing the international character of
environmental problems and are framing their responses in a more "cohesive
international and analytical framework." Trade and the Environment Hear-
ing on S. 2887 Before the Subcomm. on Intl Trade of the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1990) (statement of Donald Eiss, Deputy
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Industry) [hereinafter Hearing on S.
2887]. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
notes that "improving environmental conditions and promoting sustainable de-
velopment have become increasingly fundamental objectives. Member coun-
1992]
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membership in environmental action groups and increasing sup-
port for "Green" political parties in several nations are two com-
pelling examples of flourishing international concern.14
The other dominant impetus behind environmental condi-
tionality is the ubiquitous complaint that industries in developed
countries suffer from an unfair competitive disadvantage.15
Stringent domestic environmental protection regulations under-
lie many recent complaints of competitive disadvantage.16 Capi-
talists and politicians have joined forces to level the economic
playing field by advocating harmonized regulations in import-
competing countries or U.S. trade restrictions which will impose
commensurate costs on foreign goods and services.17 The com-
bined forces of environmental industrial and political groups are
forcing governments to consider the implications of economic
advancement on the natural environment.' 8
tries fully recognize their special responsibility in the international effort to
seek solutions to global environmental programs." Id.
14. The World Wildlife Fund, for example, has seen its membership in the
United States alone increase by more than twenty-five times in the past decade,
from twenty-five thousand to over six hundred thousand. International Envi-
ronmental Agenda for the 101st Congres" Hearing of the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1989) (statement of Russell Train,
President, World Wildlife Fund) [hereinafter Environmental Agenda].
15. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 16. The GATT
Secretariat has noted that despite the domestic character of many environmen-
tal issues, concerns with competitiveness and the state of the environment have
"internationalized" domestic environmental issues. Id.
16. "Environmental resources are another element that determines com-
parative advantage, much the same as labor force, capital and natural resource
endowment." Charles Pearson, Environment and International Economic Pol-
icy, in ENvIRoNMENT AND TRADE: THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PoLICY 46, 49 (Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham
eds., 1982).
17. The GATT Secretariat identified three strategies that those lobbying
for a level playing field may demand. raising the standards in countries with
low standards to a harmonized level; imposing duties on foreign imports to off-
set the claimed unfair cost advantage; and providing domestic subsidies. GATT,
Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 17.
Genuine concern for the state of the environment cannot be entirely sepa-
rated from domestic industry protection. It is the nationally felt need to en-
force such restrictions domestically which has led to the competitive picture
industry faces. It is also critical to recognize that productive efficiency and prof-
itability are not by definition inimical to environmental protection. Increasing
consumer demand for environmentally safe products has made the environ-
ment a marketing tool. Dolphin-safe tuna and recycled paper products are just
two examples of profitable, environment-friendly products.
18. In response to industry pressure on politicians to lower domestic envi-
ronmental standards, environmentalists support domestic producers' demands
for a "level playing field." Attacking lower foreign standards with terms like
[Vol. 1:231
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The frequent use of the term "sustainable development" 19
in environmental, economic and trade circles indicates an in-
creasing awareness that environmental issues cannot be consid-
ered in isolation but must be examined in light of global
economic development.20 The future viability of the global envi-
ronment depends upon "providing market-based incentives,
eliminating structural impediments, and ending international
trade practices that distort global markets."121 The resultant eco-
nomic dynamism achieved through free and fair trade22 will
"ecological dumping" to link "fair trade" and the environment, combined, these
forces command significant political strength. Id.
19. Sustainable development posits that long-term development of local,
regional, and global economies is dependent upon appropriate use of the Earth's
resources. The concept brings to light the notion that we do not inherit the
earth from our ancestors; rather, we borrow it from our children. "Sustainable
Development involves meeting the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Policies and Mecha-
nisms for Achieving Sustainable Development. Report by the UNCTAD Secreta-
riat, U.N. TDBOR, 38th Sess., pt. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. TD/B/1304 (1991)
[hereinafter Policies and Mechanisms for Achieving Sustainable Development].
For further discussion of the concept of sustainable development, see Sustaina-
ble Development and UNCTAD Activities, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat,
U.N. TDBOR, 37th Sess., pt. 1 at 1, U.N. Doc. TD/B/1267 (1990) [hereinafter
UNCTAD Activities].
20. As early as 1975, the international community, by way of the United
Nations Environment Programme, recognized the need to address environmen-
tal problems in a global framework. "What is necessary is integrated environ-
mental management" rather than ad hoc unilateral steps, ". . .and the
realization that the ultimate self-interest of all nations is inevitably merged in
the inescapable web of interdependences." U.N.E.P. Review, supra note 1, at 20.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
adopted Declarations on Environmental Policies at three consecutive meetings
in 1974, 1979, and 1985. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT, OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 8 (1986). The third Declaration,
adopted in June 1985, "affirms that continued environmental improvement and
sustained economic growth are interrelated and mutually enhancing objectives
." The Declaration also sets forth tactics for achieving this common goal,
which include recognizing the importance of international co-operation. Id.
21. James A. Baker, Diplomacy for the Environment: Address Before the
National Governors Association (Feb. 26, 1990), in U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, CUR-
RENT POLICY 1254, at 2 [hereinafter Baker Speech].
22. The term "free trade" is misleading. "All trade among nations involves
the sharing of reciprocal costs and benefits." William R. Robertson & Ronald
A. Di Nicola, Perspective on Free Trade: A 'Done Deal' Won't Be a Fair Deal;
Workers on Both Sides Stand to Lose Unless Environmental, Job and Other
Protections are Negotiated in Advance, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at B5. The
term fair trade suggests that these costs and benefits must be allocated fairly
among the parties.
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benefit the developed and developing world alike. 23
A. ENVIRONMENT AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE
The GATT signatories' goals of "raising standards of living"
and "developing the full use of the resources of the world" 24 sug-
gest a close nexus between economic development and the envi-
ronment. Despite this connection, environmental concerns can
conflict with GATT objectives. Environmental interests mani-
fested through protectionist non-tariff barriers to trade could
stifle the growth of the international economic system.2 Re-
strictive trade practices negatively affect world trade and impair
economic growth by distorting the price mechanism and the al-
location of resources.26
The United Nations supports incorporating environmental
concerns into all countries' development strategies. The organi-
zation cautions, however, that those concerns should "not be
used to introduce new forms of conditionality in aid or in devel-
opment financing and should not serve as a pretext for creating
unjustified barriers to trade."27 Nonetheless, the global nature
of many environmental dilemmas creates pressure to apply
trade restrictions "to influence environmental policies in third
countries."2ze Broad based recognition of the relationship be-
23. Baker Speech, supra note 21, at 2; qf INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7,
at 6-3 (additional views of Commissioner David B. Rohr).
The basic rationale for free international trade is that it promotes efficient
use of resources by encouraging countries to specialize in the production of
goods and services to which their resources are best suited and to import those
which other countries can produce more efficiently. Pearson, supra note 16, at
48. In theory, any country which fails to specialize in the industries in which it
has a competitive advantage will be priced out of the market in the absence of
trade distorting market restrictions. See DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION, Ch. VII (1817).
24. GATT preamble. These objectives are to be achieved "by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discrim-
inatory treatment in international commerce." Id.
25. INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 6-3.
26. Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion
Against Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(b), at 6, U.N. Doc. A/44/510 (1989). Report issued
pursuant to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 42/173 of 11 December 1987.
27. G.A. Res. 228, U.N. GAOR 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f), 15(i), U.N.
Doc. A/RES 44/228 (1989).
28. European Community Commission, Trade and the Environment 1
(Sept. 1991) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade) [hereinafter
EC Commission, Trade and the Environment]. "The fact that different coun-
[Vol. 1:231
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tween environmental protection and economic development is
fundamental to avoiding unnecessary, coercive, unilateral trade
barriers.2
The GATT combats unilateral trade restriction by promot-
ing trade liberalization through multilateralism and nondiscrim-
ination.3° If governments are to reconcile the goals of promoting
international commerce and protecting the global environment,
they must contemplate environmental concerns as an element of
this multilateral, nondiscriminatory trade order. Unilateral
breach of these two GATT tenets bodes poorly for both the natu-
ral environment and the trade environment.
B. RELEVANT GATT OBLIGATIONS
Free trade principles aside, there are instances when trade
measures are necessary to achieve environmental goals (e.g., a
ban on the import of dangerous substances or restrictions to en-
force domestic product norms).31 GATT's objectives of improv-
ing the global standard of living and efficiently employing the
Earth's natural resources3 2 acknowledge that "trade is a means
to an end, rather than an end in itself. '3 3
Although GATT is primarily an economic institution, there
is room within the confines of the General Agreement to explic-
itly consider non-economic concerns. A number of exceptions
allow environmental protection or other goals to take prece-
dence over the advantages to be gained from free trade.3 For
tries take up the task of environmental management according to different
schedules, with different degrees of rigor, and using different policy approaches
raises the likelihood that international trade, commercial policies, and the loca-
tion of industries will be affected." Walter, supra note 3, at 23.
29. The United States, in debate at a GATT Council meeting dedicated to
environmental issues, held 29-30 May 1991, noted that many GATT members
face urgent environmental problems at the national level the solutions to which
would have implications for other contracting parties. Trade-Environment De-
bate Narrows Down Differences, 82 GATT Focus, July 1991, at 1-2. "It [is]
therefore critical that members have a clear understanding of how GAIT rights
and obligations relate to the options that governments face." Id. at 2.
30. GATT preamble.
31. EC Commission, Trade and the Environment, supra note 28, at 1.
32. GATT1 preamble.
33. Seymour J. Rubin, A Predominantly Commercial Policy Perspective,
in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3, 3 (Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds.,
1982).
34. Id. Though the proposition that environmental protection must take
precedence over certain gains from free trade sounds inconsistent with the
premise that free trade and the environment need not be mutually exclusive,
the dichotomy is readily disposed. Once environmental protection measures are
1992]
MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
example, the general exceptions of Article XX,35 the national
security exceptions of Article XXI and the balance of payments
exceptions of Article XII permit departures from free trade pol-
icy for both economic and non-economic reasons.
Despite the growing nexus between environmental issues
and trade, GATT deals only indirectly with environmental pro-
tection goals.36 Environmental measures, as with all protective
measures that affect international trade, are subject to GATT
limitations.37 However, "GATT rules place essentially no con-
straints on the ability of countries to use appropriate policies to
protect their environment from damage from domestic produc-
tion activities or from the consumption of domestically produced
or imported products. s38 Thus, a country ordinarily may adopt
domestic policy measures such as production or consumption
charges and regulations, and may apply those charges or other
regulations to imported products at the point of ultimate sale in
the domestic market or at the point of importation.
39
Domestic environmental protection measures, however, are
subject to the GATT obligations of national treatment and non-
discrimination. Article 111:2 prohibits a country from treating
imported products less favorably than like domestic products in
imposing internal taxes or other internal charges. 4° Similarly,
universally identified and fully considered in all development programs, the en-
vironment will be another aspect of comparative advantage which may be ex-
ploited in the free trade arena.
35. See itkfra notes 44-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the en-
vironmental exception in GATT Article XX.
36. INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 2-1.
37. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy, Environmental Policy and the
GATT: Why Trade Rules and Environmental Rules Should Be Mutually Con-
sistent, 46 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr 197, 208 (1991).
38. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 5.
39. Petersmann, supra note 37, at 208. The interpretive note to Article III
set out in Annex I of the General Agreement provides that any tax or regula-
tion of the kind referred to in Article III:1 which applies to an imported product
and like domestic product but is imposed at the border against the imported
product, "is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other internal
charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph
1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III." For application of
this rule in the environmental field, see, e.g., the U.S. argument in the Tuna
case that the import ban must be judged by the same criteria as the application
of the internal regulation though applied at the border. See also Superfund
case, infra note 75.
40. Article 111:2 of the GATT provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, di-
rectly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any
kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
[Vol. 1:231
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Article III:4 obliges contracting parties to apply legal and regula-
tory requirements to imported products in a nondiscriminatory
fashion with respect to like domestic products.41 Environmental
protection measures are also subject to the Article XI prohibi-
tion on quantitative restrictions. 42 The general exceptions of
Article XX, however, may excuse "necessary" departures from
GATT obligations.43
Article XX specifically acknowledges that the Agreement
does not prevent contracting parties from adopting measures
"(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health" 44 or "(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible nat-
ural resources." 45 These measures are "[s]ubject to the require-
ment that [they] are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
... or a disguised restriction on international trade. ' 46 Much of
the recent dispute resolution activity involving Article XX has
addressed the question of which measures are "necessary" to
achieve environmental protection purposes and which are
merely disguised trade restrictions. 4
7
products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply inter-
nal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in
a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
41. Article 111:4 of the GATT provides in pertinent part:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treat-
ment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribu-
tion or use.
42. Article XI of the GATT provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
43. See Petersmann, supra note 37, at 209.
44. GATT art. XX:b.
45. GA'IT art. XX:g.
46. GATT art. XX preamble. Although art. XX does not impose a strict
MFN requirement the terms of the preamble make any derogation of MFN
questionable. EC Commission, Trade and the Environment, supra note 28, at 3
n.1.
47. See infra notes 64-95 and accompanying text on GATT dispute resolu-
tion proceedings. Though not always phrased in exact terms of necessity of the
environmental protection measure, these cases, in one way or another, deal
with unilaterally imposed trade distorting measures which have environmental
protection either as their genesis or as an incidental benefit.
One of the greatest problems facing environmental protection under GATT
1992]
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The national treatment principle does not mean that con-
tracting parties are free under Article XX to require that im-
ported products be produced in the same environmentally
conscious manner as the like domestic product.48 The Mexican
complaint in the recent Tuna case asserted that products should
not be differentiated based on production process.49 The panel
concluded that "production requirements may only be applied to
imported products if the method of production has a bearing on
the final characteristics of the product," such that the product
itself proves to be environmentally damaging when introduced
into the market of the importing country.5° Under limited cir-
cumstances, if an imported product injures the domestic envi-
ronment, Article XX may also permit regulating the foreign
product more stringently than its domestic counterpart.51
Perhaps the GATT provision which comes closest to ad-
dressing environmental concerns is the GATT Standards Code,
auspices is the appropriate measure of necessity. Article XX calls for measures
"necessary" to achieve legitimate ends. The Standards Code, however, creates a
balancing test between legitimate social objectives and their trade restrictive
effects. The question is whether the necessity requirement of Article XX re-
quires a balancing or cost/benefit type analysis. The GATT Panel on Salmon
and Herring, GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, Canada,- Measures Affecting
Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT Doc. L/6268, BISD 35th
Supp. 98, (1989) (panel report adopted Mar. 22, 1988) [hereinafter Salmon Panel
Report], required a cost-benefit analysis of Canada in which it intimated that a
trade restrictive measure is not necessary to achieve a legitimate end if the
country imposing the measure would refuse to do so if it were forced to bear the
full measure of the costs of the program. In the Salmon and Herring case, the
United States bore the entire cost of the requirement that all salmon and her-
ring be landed in Canada for inspection before export. Using its cost benefit
analysis, the panel held that the costs, if borne by Canada, would outweigh the
benefits of the conservation measure. The landing requirement was therefore
not necessary and not excused by Article XX. JdL 4.7.
48. Trade-Environment Debate Narrows Down Differences, supra note 29,
at 3 (issue stressed by Nordic countries).
49. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States: Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, Restricted, GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 1991), reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter Tuna Panel Report]. The panel in large part accepted
the Mexican argument, which the EC and Japan also supported.
50. Trade, the Environment and the GATT, Report by the European Com-
munity Commission at the Informal Meeting of Trade Ministers, The Hague, at
2 (Oct. 11, 1991) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade) [hereinaf-
ter Trade, the Environment and the GATM.
51. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 11. "For exam-
ple, phytosanitary regulations deal with the spread of pests and disease across
borders through international trade in plant material. Various plant protection
agreements permit rigorous inspection and even prohibition of imports." Id.
Article XX mandates that measures adopted thereunder may not be "arbitrary
or unjustifiable." GATT art. XX.
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drafted in the 1979 Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations. 52 The
Standards Code requirements are particularly relevant to envi-
ronmental protection because observers often criticize environ-
mental programs and regulations as being non-tariff barriers to
trade which violate GATT.53
Significant in the Standards Code is that regulations are not
to be applied with the intent of disrupting trade or with trade
restrictive effects.54 Thus, the agreement dictates that "techni-
cal regulations not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfill a legitimate objective. '5 5 Among the "legitimate objec-
tives" to be considered are the "protection of human health or
safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment."
The shortcoming of the Standards Code in the environmental
arena is the paucity of case history construing the language.
Compliance with the Standards Code requires consideration of
the risks of "non-fulfillment" 57 when determining whether a
trade restrictive measure is, in fact, necessary s to legitimate en-
vironmental programs.
Although GATT may prohibit unilaterally imposed quanti-
tative restrictions and excessive tariffs, GATT rules in other ar-
52. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code) BISD
26th Supp. 8 (1980), entered into force on January 1, 1980. Committee on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade: Report of the Committee Presented to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES at their Forty-sixth Session; reprinted in BISD 37th
Supp. 317 (1991). As of September 20, 1990, thirty-seven signatories, including
the European Economic Community, Japan and the United States have acceded
to the Agreement under Article 15.1. Id. at 317-18. U.S. implementation of the
Tokyo Round - Trade Agreements Implementation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
53. Petersmann, supra note 37, at 198.
54. Standards Code art. 2.2. There are two basic types of trade restrictive
environmental measures: (1) those that have legitimate environmental pur-
poses but have concomitant trade restrictive effects; and (2) those which facially
proclaim to be directed at environmental protection but are in fact merely dis-
guised trade restrictions. Rubin, supra note 33, at 4.
55. Standards Code art. 2.2. Unfortunately, the term "necessary" has not
been sufficiently defined to permit definitive objective analysis.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. For an in-depth analysis of the term "necessary," see the GATT panel
decision on § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel,
United States: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439, BISD
36th Supp. 345 (1990) (panel report adopted Nov. 7, 1989). The panel recognized
that if there is a GATT-consistent enforcement measure available to the con-
tracting party, then no GATT inconsistent measure will be "necessary." If,
however, only GATT inconsistent enforcement measures are viable, then the
least inconsistent measure must be adopted. Id. 5.26.
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eas are not clear.59 For instance, a country's failure to regulate
the environmental impacts of industry is arguably equivalent to
a countervailable subsidy.6° Alternatively, a total want of envi-
ronmental regulation could subject the products of the non-reg-
ulating country to antidumping duties because they are
effectively being sold at below-market prices.6' Under either of
these propositions, an implicit minimum standard of environ-
mental protection can be extracted from the penumbra of
GATT.62 In other words, the exporting country must regulate
industry to at least a minimum standard so that the lack of regu-
lation would not be a dutiable subsidy.63
C. GATT PANEL DECISIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENT
The GATT's failure to take a definitive position on the rela-
tionship of trade to the environment could impede the achieve-
ment of international accord on environmental protection.
GATT dispute resolution proceedings provide a measure of in-
sight into the interplay of the environment and the obligations
59. Hugo Paeman, EC Commission, REPORT OF THE EC COMMISSION ON
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, reported in General Developments;- European Com-
munity; Commission Analyzes Problems Posed in Post-Uruguay Round Era, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1405 (Sept. 25, 1991). The twenty-page document pre-
pared by the European Commission is part of an analysis of post-Uruguay
Round problems facing GATT signatories.
60. Kenneth S. Komoroski, Comment, The Failure of Governments to Reg-
ulate Industry: A Subsidy Under the GAT?, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 189 (1988).
61. Cf. LNT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 6-9 (additional views of Com-
missioner Rohr). The EC Commission questions the viability of a concept of
"environmental dumping." The Commission noted that the term may not be
objectively definable and could lead to pressure to eliminate other "inter-coun-
try" differences such as labor costs ("social dumping"). EC Commission, Trade
and the Environment, supra note 28, at 4.
62. Imposition of a countervailing duty (CVD) or an antidumping duty
(AD) does not require the dutied country to change its policy. The CVD/AD
merely extracts the economic benefit of the unfair trade practice by charging a
duty commensurate with the costs that would be incurred if there were suffi-
cient regulatory controls.
63. Environmental protection is not the objective of the anti-subsidy provi-
sions of the GAIT. Rather, CVDs are permissible as a means of preventing
trade distortions from governmental subsidization of industry. Countervailing
duties in this context are an extension of the polluter-pays principle (PPP),
which requires a polluting company to bear the economic costs of its own pollu-
tion. See OECD, THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE; DEFINITION ANALYSIS INTER-
PRETATION (1975). A country which does not force its companies to bear the
cost of their pollution grants an implicit subsidy and ensures the companies of a
competitive advantage. Countervailing duties take away the subsidy and re-
move the trade distortion.
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under the Agreement.6 4 Various GATT panels have conducted
dispute settlement activities implicating the aforementioned
provisions as they relate to environmental protection. These
provisions have been cited both in support of claims of unjust
trade restrictions65 and in defense thereof.66
The Article XI:1 prohibition on quantitative restrictions can
be a significant impediment to environmental protection imple-
mented through product distribution control. One GATT panel
concluded that the United States could not invoke the Article
XX(g) exception to justify a 1979 U.S. import ban on tuna and
tuna products from Canada.67 Canada argued that economic in-
terests, not conservation, prompted the U.S. action.6s Because
the United States imposed no corresponding domestic regula-
tion, as Article XI requires, the panel found that the import ban
unquestionably constituted a quantitative restriction in violation
of Article XI.69
Another case involving the interaction of Article XI and the
Article XX environmental protection exception concerned a
U.S. complaint against Canadian environmental export restric-
tions on unprocessed salmon and herring.70 Canada justified its
landing requirements on the basis of the Article XI:271 and the
XX(g) exception for protection of exhaustible resources.72 The
panel concluded that the quantitative export restrictions were
contrary to Article XI:1 and were not justified by Article XI:2 or
64. When a contracting party believes that the value of a trade concession
it has granted has been nullified or impaired by the actions of another con-
tracting party, GATT Article XXIII permits the aggrieved to request the estab-
lishment of a panel to assist the Contracting Parties to deal with the matter. A
"restatement" of GATT dispute-settlement procedures was adopted by the con-
tracting parties at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round. See Understanding Re-
garding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance,
GATT BISD 26th Supp. 210 (1980).
65. Cf. Rubin, supra note 33, at 6 ("In traditional GATT terminology, a
trade concession may be 'nullified or impaired' by the imposition or application
of an environmental measure.").
66. See INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 2-3.
67. GAT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States: Prohibition of Im-
ports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT Doc. L/5198, BISD 29th
Supp. 91 (1983) (panel report adopted Feb. 22, 1982).
68. INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 2-3.
69. For the full text of Article XI:I, see supra note 42.
70. Salmon Panel Report, supra note 47.
71. Canada argued that its restrictions were "necessary to the application
of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of com-
modities in international trade." Id. 4.1.
72. Canada claimed that its landing requirements were necessary to effec-
tuate its species conservation programs. Id. 3.5.
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XX(g) because the restrictions were not primarily aimed at the
conservation of salmon and herring and were unnecessarily re-
strictive of trade.73
A third dispute addressed complaints by Canada, the Euro-
pean Community and Mexico about funding of the U.S.
Superfund 74 environmental cleanup program by taxes that were
higher on imported goods than on domestic products.75 The
United States claimed that the taxes were permissible under
GATT Articles II:2(a) 76 and III:2. 7 It argued that the higher
taxes on imports included the tax that would apply to the chemi-
cals used in producing the imported goods, had they been made
in the United States. The panel accepted the notion of a non-
discriminatory equalizing tax, but rejected the differential
scheme the United States had adopted and held the tax inconsis-
tent with Article 111:2.
The aforementioned cases all dealt with a party claiming
that the impact on their domestic environment necessitated the
trade restriction at issue. Although the panel reports evidence
how GATT can account for national measures when examining
whether imported goods have been discriminated against in the
importing country, the reports do not discuss production-related
activities in the exporting country. 78 Only recently has a GATT
panel addressed the issue of unilateral extraterritorial environ-
mental protection.
In 1991, a panel adjudicated Mexico's complaint against the
United States' import restrictions on Mexican tuna.79 The
United States accused Mexico of violating the U.S. Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act (MMPA).80 The United States invoked sec-
73. For a more complete discussion of this case, see supra note 47.
74. The United States Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (signed into law on Oct. 17, 1986).
75. See United States: Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Sub-
stances, GATT Doc. L/6175, BISD 34th Supp. 136 (1988) (panel report adopted
June 17, 1987).
76. GATT Article 11:2(a) permits the imposition on imports of "a charge
equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of para-
graph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product .. "
77. The national treatment principle of Article 111:2 calls for nondiscrimi-
natory treatment of imported goods in respect "to internal taxes or other inter-
nal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like
domestic products."
78. INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 2-1.
79. Tuna Panel Report, supra note 49, at 1598. See also, GATT: US. Em-
bargo On Mexican Tuna Violates Gatt Rules, Panel Finds, 8 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1288 (Aug. 28, 1991).
80. Pub. L. No.92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972) (as amended, notably by Pub. L.
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tion 101(a)(2)(B) 81 of the MMPA to ban the importation of
Mexican yellowfin tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
(ETP)82 using the "purse seine" technique. This technique has
excessive incidental dolphin kill rates.s3 The United States jus-
tified the prohibition under Article XX(b) as a measure neces-
sary to protect the lives or health of dolphins" and under
Article XX(g) as a measure to protect an exhaustible natural
resource.s5 Mexico argued, and the panel agreed, that Articles
XX(b) and XX(g) must be interpreted to limit measures protect-
ing life and health to the regulating country's territorys8 This
limitation on extraterritorial environmental protection means
that domestically instituted programs aimed at safeguarding the
environment outside a country's own territory violate GATT.8 7
No. 100-711, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988) (codified in part at 16 U.S.C. 1361ff)). Section
101(a)(2) creates a mandatory prohibition by which the Secretary of the Treas-
ury "shall ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish which
have been caught with commercial fishing technology which results in the inci-
dental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United
States standards."
81. Section 101(a)(2)(B) provides that importation of yellowfin tuna har-
vested with purse seine nets in the ETP and products therefrom is prohibited
unless the Secretary of Commerce finds that (1) the government of the harvest-
ing country has a program of regulating the taking of marine mammals that is
comparable to that of the United States, and (2) the average rate of incidental
taking of marine mammals by vessels of the harvesting nation is comparable to
the average rate of such taking by the United States vessels. The burden is on
the exporting country to establish compliance through documentary evidence.
1d.
82. The ETP is a portion of the Pacific Ocean bounded just north of San
Francisco, California to the north, through Valdivia, Chile in the south, and the
western edge of the Hawaiian islands to the west.
83. The foreign allowable rate for each year is measured as 1.25 times the
actual U.S. fleet taking rate for the same year. Thus, it is not known until year-
end whether the foreign rate exceeds the U.S. rate. If so, the embargo com-
mences automatically and remains in effect until compliance is achieved, which
cannot be certified until the end of the next calendar year, resulting in an im-
port ban of twelve months or more.
84. Tuna Panel Report, supra note 49, at 1606, 3.33. The GATT Council
has deferred consideration of the panel's report for formal adoption at the re-
quest of the United States and Mexico, which are trying to resolve the dispute
bilaterally. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 14.
85. Tuna Panel Report, supra note 49, at 1607 3.40.
86. Id at 1619-21 5.24-5.34.
87. In letters to President Bush and USTR Carla Hills, Rep. Barb Boxer,
joined by 62 of her colleagues, said the Panel ruling, if adopted, could be used to
defeat trade measures applied by the United States or any other country to pro-
mote conservation of wildlife or natural resources outside its own territorial
jurisdiction. Trade Policy: Members of Congress Protest Recent GATT Ruling
on U.S. Embargo of Mexican Tuna, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1399 (Sept. 25,
1991).
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Because GATT prohibits extraterritorial environmental
regulation through trade impediments, the world community
may mistakenly infer that GATTr will not protect the global en-
vironment88 GATT, however, apparently permits trade sanc-
tions as a means to protect the environment when such
sanctions are implemented as part of a multinational accord.
Although no GAIT panel has formally addressed the issue of
multilateral, environmentally-motivated trade barriers, consen-
sus among scholars is that multilateral agreements are permissi-
ble under GATT even though they may restrict trade.89 The
GATT Secretariat has noted that "GATT rules could never
block the adoption of environmental policies which have broad
support in the world community."' 0 International agreements
which prohibit all trade in a product by banning it at the point of
sale or importation regardless of the product's origin or destina-
tion are consistent with GATT.91 GATr-consistency is question-
able, however, where an agreement discriminates between
parties and non-parties.9 For example, the trade conditioning
provisions of the Montreal Protoc0193 and the Basel Conven-
tion" require countries to apply more restrictive trade provi-
sions to non-parties than to parties.95 The GATT membership
has not yet addressed the issue of whether these departures
from the nondiscrimination principle are permissible under Ar-
ticle XX.9
Even if this kind of multilateral agreement is not directly
88. EC Commission, Trade and the Environment, supra note 28, at 1 (dis-
cussing misconceptions that GAT hinders domestic policies or "efforts to
tackle global environmental challenges").
89. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 12. The Tuna
panel suggested that the United States could have pursued its environmental
objectives " 'through the negotiation of international cooperative agreements."'
Trade, the Environment and the GA7T, supra note 50, at 2 (quoting the GATT
Panel Report).
90. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 6.
91. Id. at 11. For instance, the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) could legitimately be en-
forced through a broad trading ban. This does, however, require the
participation of all countries involved. Id.
92. Id.
93. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
94. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22,1989, UNEP Doc. IG 80/3,28 IL.M.
657 (1989) (in force as of May 5, 1992 for twenty countries not including the
United States).
95. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 11.
96. Id.
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consistent with the GATT's present terms, aggrieved parties will
have difficulty finding compensation in the GATT system. The
signatories to such multinational accords, with support of two-
thirds of GATT's membership, could amend GATT or could
qualify for a waiver under Article XXV to permit the trade re-
strictive measures in question.9 7 Recognizing that GATT itself
is a multilateral agreement, by definition other multilateral
agreements may be permissible under GATT, despite the fact
that they violate GATT's tenet of nondiscrimination.
D. GATT's ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Contracting parties have historically recognized GATT's
role in environmental protection. The Working Party on Envi-
ronmental Measures and International Trade was created in
1971, but until recently, that working party had never been con-
vened.98  In 1991, the European Free Trade Association
(EF'fA),99 with U.S. support, proposed that the 1971 Working
Party on Environmental Measures and International Trade be
convened to promote the role of GATT in environmental protec-
tion.1° ° The preliminary agenda for the Working Party includes
discussion of the relationship between GATT and Multilateral
Environmental Conventions.10 1 GATT's resolution of this issue
is critical to avoiding the threat that countries adversely im-
pacted could challenge the trade provisions of these agreements
as being contrary to GATT.10 2
The United States Congress has not rejected GATT as the
97. Id. at 12. GATT's current membership is 104 countries. Seventy coun-
tries, two-thirds of the membership, constitute a sufficient majority to amend
the Agreement or grant a waiver.
98. Although it has not been convened, the Working Party's existence is
not contested; it has a designated chairman and a mandate. Trade-Environment
Debate Narrows Down Differences, supra note 29, at 1-2. Not all parties sup-
ported convening the Working Party so quickly. The members of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand) urged caution in proceeding with the Working Party and stressed
the need for consultations. Id.
99. The member nations of EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland.
100. Trade-Environment Debate Narrows Down Differences, supra note 29,
at 2. The European Community believes the GATT provides a viable frame-
work for a global environmental policy. Trade, the Environment and the
GAT, supra note 50, at 3. The EC has cautioned, however, that the GATT
should not attempt to harmonize global environmental policies. Trade-Envi-
ronment Debate Narrows Down Differences, supra note 29, at 3.
101. Trade, the Environment and the GATT, supra note 50, at 3.
102. Id. at 4.
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appropriate body to address the trade consequences of lax envi-
ronmental protection policies.'0 3 As early as 1988, congressional
leaders advocated inclusion of environmental issues in the Uru-
guay Round.1° 4 More recently, Representative Jolene Unsoeld
introduced House bill H.R. 3431, which specifically requires the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to "actively seek
to" reform articles of GATT to take into consideration national
and international environmental law. 05 Additionally, House of
Representatives Concurrent Resolution 227 expresses the sense
of Congress that the president should call on GATT members to
support national and international efforts to protect the world
environment and should reject any GATT action which does not
protect the environment.106
In spite of congressional efforts to promote environmental
issues in GATT, there is strong indication that the U.S. Congress
will act unilaterally in the absence of multilateral action.10 7 Do-
mestic industry's growing environmental costs and resulting
competitive disadvantage, 0 8 coupled with the CONTRACTING
PARTIES' reluctance to directly address environmental protec-
tion within the confines of GATT,1° 9 is prompting the U.S. Con-
gress to protect domestic manufacturers and the global
environment through unilateral initiatives.
103. 137 CONG. REC. S13169 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Baucus) (counseling for a GATT environmental code modeled on the current
subsidies code).
104. 137 CONG. REC. S708 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan).
105. H.R. 3431, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (pending).
106. H.R. Con. Res. 227, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (expressing the sense of
the Congress that the president should encourage the contracting parties to the
GATT to support national and international efforts to protect the world envi-
ronment, and that the president should oppose GATT actions which circum-
scribe United States protection of the global environment). See also H.R. Con.
Res. 246, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (expressing the sense of the Congress on
the relationship between trade agreements and the environment); H.R. Con.
Res. 247, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (expressing the sense of the Congress that
the United States should not enter any international agreement or approve any
international report that would hinder U.S. authority to police the world
environment).
107. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text on legislation linking
trade and the environment through unfair trade practices, import restrictions,
and countervailing duties.
108. The cost of compliance with environmental regulations raises produc-
tion cost and sales price, making U.S. goods less attractive on the world and
domestic markets.
109. See supra notes 98, 100.
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PART II: U.S. LEGISLATION LINKING TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
The current trend in congressional efforts to further envi-
ronxnental protection goals through international trade policy is
analogous to Congress's treatment of labor rights conditionality
in the 1980s.110 As with labor rights conditionality, environmen-
tal protection concerns emanate from two levels. The first is so-
cietal concern - worker rights for the former and
environmental quality for the latter. The second is economic
concern for U.S. competitive disadvantage attributable to mini-
mal labor regulation or lax environmental protection abroad. 1 '
Congress began addressing the conjunction between labor
rights and access to the United States market with three pieces
of legislation in the mid-1980s.112 Congress conditioned non-re-
ciprocal benefits to developing countries under the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI),113 the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP),1 1 4 and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
110. For an exposition on U.S. legislation conditioning access to American
markets on respect for labor rights, see Theresa A. Amato, Note, Labor Rights
Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and the International Trade
Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79 (1990); Ian C. Ballon, The Implication of Making
the Denial of Internationally Recognized Worker Rights Actionable Under Sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 28 VA. J. INT'L LAw 73 (1987).
111. "Empirical studies suggest causation in asserting that cost differences
due to differences in environmental regulations are substantial...." GATT,
Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 20.
For a critical review of the evidence substantiating the impairment of the
competitive economic position of U.S. industries because of non-subsidized envi-
ronmental controls, see Pearson, supra note 16, at 50. For theory on the inter-
play of economics and environment, see INGO WALTER, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS (2d ed., 1975); STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL Eco-
NOMICS (Ingo Walter ed., 1976); Stephen P. Magee & William F. Ford, Environ-
mental Pollution, the Terms of Trade and Balance of Payments of the United
States, 25 KYKLOS 101 (No. 1, 1972); Anthony Y.C. Koo, Environmental Reper-
cussions and Trade Theory, 56 REV. ECON. & STAT. 235; and Blackhurst, Inter-
national Trade and Domestic Environmental Policies in a Growing World
Economy, LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES DANs UN MONDE EN MUTATION
341 (1977).
112. Amato, supra note 110, at 96.
113. Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983--Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-06 (1988)). The CBI authorizes the president to proclaim duty-free
treatment for all eligible articles from a beneficiary country. Id. The statute
also establishes conditions and guidelines to determine beneficiary status. Id.
114. Amendments under the Generalized System of Preferences Renewal
Act of 1984 were enacted as § 501 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65 (1988)). The GSP
enables the president to grant unilateral, nonreciprocal duty-free treatment to
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(OPIC) Act 15 upon respect for minimum labor standards." 6
After failing to achieve adequate consideration of labor rights
issues within the GATT framework,117 Congress acted unilater-
ally, passing the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 (OTCA)." 8 The OTCA characterizes labor rights abuses as
an unfair trade practice actionable under section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974.119
Congress has not yet enacted an environmental protection
provision analogous to the OTCA. However, encouraged by pas-
sage of legislation in the labor rights field, environmental activ-
ists and industry advocates have introduced a number of trade-
conditioning environmental bills and resolutions in the past
three congressional sessions.120 Regardless of how the legisla-
eligible articles from beneficiary countries when he determines that doing so
would advance the economic development of Third World countries. Id.
115. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-204, § 5, 99 Stat. 1669, 1670 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of
22 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985) and 31 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985)). "OPIC insures U.S.
private investors against certain political risks, provides investment guarantees,
and directly finances eligible projects in developing countries." Ballon, supra
note 110, at 82 n.47.
116. See generally Ballon, supra note 110.
117. The United States has been a primary proponent of a social or labor
clause in the GATT because GATT members can enforce compliance with the
clause through trade sanctions. Amato, supra note 110, at 92. Labor standards
were one of the Reagan Administration's prime negotiating objectives for the
GATT Uruguay Round. See U.S. Objectives in the New Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (Statement of Clayton Yeutter, former USTR, before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Sen. Comm. on Finance (May 14, 1986)), re-
printed in U.S. Trade Law and Policy, 408 PRAc. L. INST. 427, 437 (1987).
Among the measures the United States has proposed to garner support for
worker rights consideration in the GATT are a working party on labor rights
and a GATT study of the issue of labor rights in the GATT. See Amato, supra
note 110 at 93-95. The United States has encountered significant opposition to
its attempts to introduce labor rights in the GATT, particularly from develop-
ing countries. These countries view the U.S. efforts as an attempt to eliminate
cheap labor as the developing countries' one element of comparative advantage.
See id. at 94. See also International Workers' Rights, Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on Human Rights and Int7 Orgs. of the Comm on Foreign Aff of the
House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (statement of Rep. Don
Bonker) (linking rights to trade "is widely perceived as protectionist"). Simi-
larly, developing countries have complained that the environment has been
used as a "convenient cover for protectionist motives." Trade-Environment De-
bate Narrows Down Differences, supra note 29, at 1-2.
118. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA), Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
119. Id.; Amato, supra note 110, at 96.
120. In congressional debate held on the amendments to S. 1630, Senator
Lautenberg remarked that the legislation he would be introducing, S. 2887, is
"consciously modeled after the labor standards in section 301 and in the GSP
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ture works out the details of these bills, the measures evince
Congress's concern that the United States is protecting the
global environment at the expense of American competitive-
ness.121 This protectionist rationale suggests that if the interna-
tional community does not act multilaterally, the U.S. Congress
will unilaterally attempt to protect the global environment and
to protect U.S. industry's competitive position in world
markets.122
A. RECENT LEGISLATION LINKING ACCESS TO U.S. MARKETS
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS
Congress's efforts to link trade policy to environmental pro-
tection goals can be categorized into three general courses of
conduct: (a) classifying breaches of national and international
environmental protection measures as unfair trade practices
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974;123 (b) restricting im-
ports from and exports to countries which fail to enforce na-
tional and international environmental conventions and
agreements; 24 and (c) imposing countervailing duties against
countries which fail to heed U.S. demands for environmental
safeguarding. 125
1. Section 301 Unfair Trade Practices
Senate bill S. 59 entitled "General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade for the Environment Act of 1991," is the latest in a
law .. " 136 CONG. REC. S3023 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg). See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
121. "[I]t simply does not make economic sense for American industry to
shoulder the costs of global environmental protection ... [while] foreign indus-
tries continue to pollute the world." 136 CONG. REC. S3003 (daily ed. Mar. 22,
1990) (statement of Sen. Dixon) (supporting trade conditioning amendment to
the Clean Air Act)
122. 137 CONG. REC. S13170 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Baucus) (remarking that unilateral changes in countervailing duty law may be
necessary if trading partners are unwilling to negotiate environmental
protection).
123. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
124. See infa notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
Senator Lautenberg has also proposed legislation which would condition
entitlement to nonreciprocal benefits under the generalized system of prefer-
ences (GSP) and Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBI) on environ-
mental safeguards. S. 2887, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). In support of his bill,
Senator Lautenberg has argued that the status of the GSP and CBI as excep-
tions to the GATT release the administration of those programs from the obli-
gations of nondiscriminatory treatment. Hearing on S. 2887, supra note 13, at 9
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
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series of parallel bills introduced in the past three Congresses. 26
In addition to promoting direct consideration of the environ-
ment within GATT, S. 59, like its predecessors, seeks to author-
ize the president to take unilateral action under section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974 .127 The bill would treat other countries'
acts and practices that diminish the effectiveness of interna-
tional agreements protecting endangered species as unreasona-
ble under section 301.128
Section 301 grants the president broad discretion to retaliate
against the products of a country whose trade policies or prac-
tices are "unreasonable," "unjustifiable" or "discriminatory"
and "burden or restrict U.S. commerce."'129 Scholars have inter-
preted "unreasonableness" to encompass more than just those
actions which would nullify or impair benefits under GATT. 13°
Thus, section 301 relief is often directed at changing foreign gov-
ernmental practices, rather than remedying specifically identifi-
able injuries to domestic industries.131
Senate bill S. 2887 also sought to amend section 301 to re-
quire countries to maintain certain minimum environmental
standards.132 Under this legislation, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) would be required to determine what
constitutes an effective, generally-observed environmental stan-
dard.133 Upon finding that a country fails to maintain adequate
regulations, the USTR would have authority to restrict imports
from the offending country. 134
At hearings on S. 2887, Senator Lautenberg, the bill's spon-
126. S. 59, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1991).
127. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, (1974) (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16 (1988)) (West Supp. 1987).
Section 301 authorizes the United States Trade Representative (USTR),
subject to the direction of the president, to take action where he/she deter-
mines that:
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are
being denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country -
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or
otherwise denies benefits to the United States under,
any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory and
burdens or restricts United States commerce.
128. S. 59, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1991).
129. See supra note 127.
130. Ballon, supra note 110, at 95.
131. IM at 105.
132. S. 2887, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (1990).
133. IML § 4(b).
134. McL § 4(b).
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sor, emphasized the sagacity of using U.S. trade leverage to
achieve important policy goals.135 The bill is intended to level
the playing field for American businesses hampered by the cost
of compliance with environmental regulations.'3 Senator
Lautenberg justified the provision for Section 301 action by anal-
ogizing that: "just as cutting costs by exploiting workers is un-
fair trade under Section 301," so is cutting costs by exploiting the
environment. 137
2. Quantitative Import and Export Restrictions
Two pieces of legislation introduced in the 101st Congress,
House bills H.R. 132138 and H.R. 2519,139 were directed at pro-
tecting wildlife for moral reasons rather than at alleviating com-
petitive disadvantage. These bills are remarkable for the
breadth of the trade restrictions they would impose. H.R. 132
would authorize the president to ban imports of any product-
not just fishery products-from countries found to "diminish the
effectiveness" of an international fishery conservation program.
Similarly, H.R. 2519, in addition to calling for import and export
bans on ivory, would require the president to revoke most-fa-
vored-nation treatment for all products from countries that do
not adequately enforce elephant protection measures.
Among other quantitative restrictions aimed at decreasing
U.S. companies' competitive disadvantage, the Senate Commit-
tee on Environment and Public Works included among its pro-
posed 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act an import ban to
compel foreign governments to adopt chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)
regulations similar to those the United States adopted pursuant
to the Montreal Protocol.14° As amended, S. 1630 would prohibit
imports of products containing or manufactured with CFCs, un-
less both the manufacturing country and the exporting country
have signed and complied with the Montreal Protocol. 141
135. Hearing on S. 2887, supra note 13, at 8 (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
136. Id
137. Id
138. H.R. 132, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
139. H.R. 2519, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
140. Amendment number 1321 to amendment number 1293 to amend S.
1630, an amendment to the Clean Air Act. 136 CONG. REc. S3000 (daily ed. Mar.
22, 1990). S.1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (enacted Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399).
141. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (enacted Nov. 15, 1990).
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3. Countervailing Duties
If passed, proposed amendment 1321 to the Clean Air Act
would have required the Secretary of Commerce to establish a
schedule of fees to be imposed upon any product imported into
the United States that was produced in a manner which does not
comply with the air quality standards prescribed in the Clean
Air Act.142 Though not categorized as such, this provision would
have been tantamount to a countervailing duty on imported
products produced or manufactured in an environmentally neg-
ligent manner.
The most unilaterally trade restrictive measure proposed to
date is S. 984, sponsored by Senator David L. Boren.143 Elevat-
ing concern to the next level, the Boren bill would impose coun-
tervailing duties on imports produced abroad under
environmental standards less strict than those in the United
States. The Boren bill specifically identifies "the failures of a
government to impose effective environmental controls on pro-
duction and manufacturing within its borders," as a "significant
and unfair subsidy." 44 Senator Boren justified the harsh meas-
ures in his bill noting:
The increasing globalization of the world economy has meant that
strictly regulating pollution within our borders, while maintaining the
largest and most open market in the world, can impair our competi-
tiveness and provide unfair advantages to foreign competitors subject
to less stringent or effective pollution control.145
The Boren bill would counter the competitive advantage
that foreign producers receive from less stringent environmen-
tal regulation by imposing a duty, equal to the "cost which would
have to be incurred by the manufacturer or producer of the for-
eign articles of merchandise to comply with environmental stan-
dards imposed on U.S. producers of the same class or kind of
merchandise." 146
Not only would the Boren bill protect U.S. markets, it
would create an additional market for U.S. pollution control
equipment. Fifty percent of the revenue gained through coun-
tervailing duties would be placed in an export fund. The Agency
142. Amendment number 1321 to amendment number 1293 to amend S.
1630, an amendment to the Clean Air Act. 136 CONG. REC. S3000 (daily ed. Mar.
22, 1990).
143. S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
144. Id § 2.
145. 137 CONG. REc. S5299 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991) (statements on intro-
duced bills and joint resolutions) (statement of Sen. Boren).
146. Id-
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for International Development (AID) would administer the
fund, distributing monies from the fund to developing countries
to help them purchase U.S. pollution control equipment.147
B. VIOLATIONS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE
The environment/trade bills introduced in the 101st and
102d Congresses demonstrate that a measure which purportedly
protects the environment may really be designed to protect do-
mestic industry.148 Even when a measure is legitimately con-
cerned with the environment, it may restrict trade more than is
necessary to achieve the environmental objective. 49 Regardless
of their purpose, the recent environment/trade bills in Congress
would likely violate GATT, depending on their language and im-
plementation upon enactment.
The most blatant examples of measures violating GATT are
the bills that authorize quantitative restrictions, a violation of
GATT Article XI, unless justified by GATT Article XX. Also
highly suspect are the Boren bill's countervailing duties.
Whether the general underenforcement of pollution control
measures is in fact a countervailable subsidy within the meaning
of GATT has yet to be resolved. "[U]nder most countries' laws,
including those of the United States, a subsidy that is generally
available is not countervailable" because it is not a benefit to a
specific industry ise
If implemented, each of the three types of proposed envi-
ronment/trade bills would probably violate GATT's require-
ment of nondiscrimination.' 5 ' Whether the trade restrictive
measures employed are sanctions under section 301, quantitative
restrictions, or countervailing duties, the discretionary nature of
147. Id.
148. Rubin, supra note 33, at 4. For example, at the congressional hearing
on S. 2887, the AFL-CIO's Legislative Representative remarked: "It is [Senator
Lautenberg's] view and ours that products made in an environmentally unsafe
manner constitutes an unfair trade practice.... [It] unfairly reduces the cost of
production which does not have to meet any environmental standards." This
statement indicates that one group supporting the legislation perceives the bill
more as a means to protect domestic industry from unfair competition than to
protect the environment. Hearing on S. 2887, supra note 13, at 14 (statement of
William J. Cunningham, Legislative Representative, AFL-CIO).
149. Cf United States: Section 337 of the Tar(ff Act of 1930, supra note 58, i]
5.26.
150. INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 6-9 (additional views of Comm'r
Rohr).
151. GATT art. I.
1992]
MINN . GLOBAL TRADE
the enforcement measures and the politicized procedures for in-
stituting the measures make it unlikely that all U.S. trading
partners will receive equal treatment.
C. VIOLATIONS OF MULTILATERALISM
GATT violations aside, the aspect of these bills that contin-
ues to attract the most criticism is their unilateral nature.152
The GATT itself is the product of multilateral negotiations and
has evolved through a series of multilateral negotiating rounds.
The United States has traditionally been a staunch supporter of
trade liberalization through the GATT's multilateral frame-
work.153 That support is apparently waning, however, as Con-
gress increasingly pursues unilateral solutions to its trade
problems.'54 At a time when the United States is engaged in
multilateral negotiations in the GATT Uruguay Round, congres-
sional support for unilateral trade restrictions to protect the en-
vironment undermines the United States' credibility and its
negotiating strength.'5 The United States cannot legitimately
ask other countries to eliminate existing barriers to trade while
Congress is creating new elements of conditionality. 1'
Not all of the bills calling for unilateral action overlook the
merits of multilateralism. To aid the harmonization of nations'
environmental laws, the seminal provision of S. 59 directs sev-
eral executive branches to jointly investigate international envi-
ronmental agreements and foreign nations' environment,
conservation and health laws.157 Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni-
han, sponsor of S. 59, contends that the United States needs a
better understanding of the current environmental protection
situation before national policies can be harmonized into a
"GATT for the Environment."'15 This clearly expresses the
152. See, e.g., INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 6-3 (additional views of
Comm'r Rohr); id. at E-3 (statement on behalf of the American Association of
Exporters and Importers); id. at D-4 (statement of Competitive Enterprise In-
stitute). For general criticisms of unilateral trade measures see Richard B.
Bilder, The Rule of Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Envi-
ronmental Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51 (1981); Ballon, supra note 110;
Amato, supra note 110.
153. See Amato, supra note 110, at 87, 89 n.66.
154. See supra note 127 for a partial text of the current version of Con-
gress's most significant unilateral measure, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
155. INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at E-10 (submission of the American
Association of Exporters and Importers).
156. Id.
157. S. 59, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1991).
158. 137 CONG. REC. S708 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Moyni-
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Senator's understanding that environmental policy and trade
policy need to be linked in a multilateral framework. 5 9 Despite
his belief in the international trade order, however, Senator
Moynihan proposes using unilateral trade restrictions under sec-
tion 301.160
Promoting a so-called "GATT for the Environment" is a
commendable objective. Until there is international consensus,
however, the United States is not justified in unilaterally impos-
ing its environmental values on the rest of the world.161 More-
over, imposing unilateral restrictions in the interim may defeat
U.S. desires to achieve multilateral protection of the environ-
ment. Discriminatory trade restrictions not directly tied to par-
ticular environmental issues are an ineffective way of promoting
multilateral cooperation. 16 2 Using section 301 to retaliate
against lax environmental regulation, which is not generally rec-
ognized in the international community as an unfair trade prac-
tice, would undermine U.S. trading partners' confidence in
multilateral dispute resolution.163 In fact, resorting to unilateral
action presupposes that the United States does not have a valid
complaint under GATT. 1' 4
Moreover, the international community opposes unilateral
economic coercion. "Deploring" the use of coercive economic
measures, the United Nations General Assembly asked the Sec-
retary-General to examine methods of curtailing developed
countries' abuse of economic measures as a means of directly or
indirectly coercing sovereign decisions of developing coun-
tries.16 5 Several international organizations and subdivisions
han). The bill would by statute make it an "objective of the United States to
negotiate in the GATT framework a new agreement to harmonize environmen-
tal, conservation and health laws and enforcement." I
159. Id. at S707 (statement of Sen. Moynihan) (the legal framework of
GATT dispute resolution provides enforceability and gives trade law a "clear
advantage over environmental law.").
160. Id. (statement of Sen. Moynihan) (commenting that weak international
enforcement of environmental treaties "has led many of us [in Congress] to
urge unilateral action.").
161. Cf. Ballon, supra note 110, at 121 (in the absence of international con-
sensus on the relationship between trade policy and worker rights, the United
States should not retaliate unilaterally).
162. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 4.
163. Ballon, supra note 110, at 122; Bronckers, Private Response to Foreign
Urtfair Trade Practices, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 651, 704 (1984).
164. A country with lower environmental standards than the United States
would not necessarily nullify or impair any U.S. benefits under the GATT. Bal-
lon, supra note 110, at 104.
165. Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion,
supra note 26. This is not an entirely new contention in the international coin-
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within the United Nations system, including GATT and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), contributed to the preparation of the Secretary
General's report. 66 "Reaffirming" the sovereign rights of
states,16 7 and "[b]earing in mind the general principles gov-
erning international trade,"'6 UNCTAD's "rejection of coercive
economic measures"' 69 and the principles and rules of GATT, 170
the General Assembly
Call[ed] upon the developed countries to refrain from exercising polit-
ical coercion through the application of economic instruments with the
purpose of inducing changes in the economic or social systems, as well
as in the domestic or foreign policies, of other countries .... 171
The United States' threat of or use of unilateral trade measures
would contradict the spirit of multilateralism promoted in
GATT and other international bodies.
Even if unilateral actions did not violate both GATT and the
international community's desire to solve problems multilater-
ally, they would still be ineffective. Trading partners may resist
and retaliate against unilateral actions, preventing the actions
from achieving goals of fair trade and environmental protection.
Indeed, retaliatory responses will only encourage the break-
down of international cooperation. 172
The European Community has emphasized that interna-
tional cooperation is important to avoid the risk of "compensa-
tory trade restrictions on the basis of the argument that third
munity. Earlier reports of the Secretary-General on the same subject were sub-
mitted to the General Assembly at its 39th Session (A/39/415) pursuant to
resolution 38/197 of 18 December 1983, at its 40th session (A/40/596) pursuant
to resolution 39/210 of 18 December 1984, at its 41st session (A/41/739) pursuant
to resolution 40/185 of 17 December 1985, and at its 42nd session (A/42/660)
pursuant to resolution 41/165 of 5 December 1986.
166. Id.
167. Article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States de-
clares that "no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights."
168. Contained in Res. 1995 (XIX) of 30 December 1964.
169. UNCTAD Res. 152 (VI) U.N. TDBOR, Proceedings of the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Developmen4 Sixth Session, vol. I, Report and
Annexes (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.D.6), part one, sect. A.
170. Paragraph 7 (iii) of the Ministerial Declaration adopted on November
29, 1982 by the CONTRACTING PARTIES at their 38th session. See BISD 29th
Supp. 11 (Sales No. GATT/1983-1), GATT doc. L/5424.
171. G.A. Res. 44/215, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess. (Feb. 12, 1990).
172. Hearing on S. 2887, supra note 13, at 3-4 (statement of Mr. Eiss).
Although unilateral restrictions such as § 301 may provide the United States
with a strong bargaining chip in international negotiations, it only serves to in-
crease animosity in relations with our trading partners.
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countries are subject to laxer environmental requirements.' 173
Such restrictions "could be a source of considerable trade ten-
sion and result in a very costly fragmentation of markets."'' 74 If
the sanctions imposed pursuant to section 301 for failure to pro-
tect the environment nullify or impair GATT benefits, the af-
fected country could reasonably withdraw compensatory GATT
benefits. 17 5
The retaliating country would have a strong case, in the ab-
sence of international consensus on appropriate environmental
standards, that the United States' unilateral restrictions violate
GATT.176 The country may then seek authorization from the
CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII:2 to withdraw
concessions given to the United States,17 7 or could simply follow
the U.S. lead and impose retaliatory sanctions. The possible lay-
ers of counter-retaliation seem particularly senseless when one
realizes that the imposed sanctions may have no relationship to
the original environmental objective.
Because developed countries have environmental regula-
tions similar to the United States and are economically powerful
enough to retaliate, they would rarely be targets of unilateral
U.S. action to enforce environmental standards. The more
likely targets would be developing countries. The ability of de-
veloping countries to enforce strict environmental standards,
however, will require either diverting capital from their eco-
nomic development or obtaining transfer payments from devel-
oped countries. 178 Unilaterally restricting trade with developing
countries would diminish their prospects for economic develop-
173. Commission Analyzes Problems Posed in Post-Uruguay Round Era,
supra note 59, at 1405 (quoting Report of EC Commission on Trade and
Environment).
174. Id.
175. Ballon, supra note 110, at 121.
176. Id.; See supra text accompanying note 151 (summarizing GATT
illegality).
177. GATT Article XXIII:2 states:
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are
serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting
party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this
Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.
178. One feasible solution for an equitable division of the burden of environ-
mental protection is for the developed world to forgive Third World debt in
exchange for commitment to environmental protection. See generally Promot-
ing International Environmental Protection Through Foreign Debt Exchange
Transactions, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 65; the Feasibility of Debt-For-Nature
Swaps, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 127.
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ment, making aid from developed countries necessary to regu-
late their environment. Unless the United States is willing to
provide economic aid to the countries against which it imposes
trade sanctions,179 the emphasis of environment/trade legisla-
tion should change from confrontation to cooperation in achiev-
ing environmental goals.
A final problem with the effectiveness of the proposed envi-
ronment/trade bills is the implied assertion that environmental
legislation enacted by the United States is appropriate for all
other countries. This is probably not the case. It would be
nearly impossible for a single country to establish appropriate
standards for all its trading partners. The U.S. federal govern-
ment is unable to promulgate a single appropriate standard for
the entire United States. Individual states are left to their own
initiative to enact environmental protection laws commensurate
with their needs.1s Similarly, sovereign states must be free to
establish environmental protection laws appropriate to their so-
cial, political, and natural environment.' 8 ' A unilateral U.S.
mandate of environmental protection by its trading partners8 2
would result in tremendous cost and inefficiency if the pre-
scribed levels of protection are inappropriate.'i 3
179. Of the congressional bills discussed in this Note, the Boren bill, supra
note 143, contains the most concrete plans to help developing countries protect
their environment. The Boren bill would use half of all countervailing duties
collected to help developing countries purchase U.S.-made pollution control
equipment. Imposition of duties will raise product prices and decrease demand,
however, allowing less capital to return to the developing country and limiting
the size of the fund to assist equipment purchases. The result still may be a
poorer developing country with inadequate environmental protection. Hearing
on S. 2887, supra note 13, at 4 (statement of Mr. Eiss).
180. Id, at 3. Mr. Eiss points out that regional environmental demands in
southern California necessitate far more stringent standards than Federal stan-
dards. Just as it would be inconsistent to say that other States of the Federal
Government have "inadequate standards because they do not mirror Califor-
nia's" the conclusion should not change when it is the policies of another nation
under consideration. Id.
181. I& A fundamental assumption behind allowing all countries to choose
environmental protection standards for themselves is that they base their deci-
sions on ideals of sustainable development. Multilateral coordination and en-
forcement are necessary to ensure that an economically and socially depressed
country does not destroy its own environment and the global environment in an
effort to achieve a tolerable standard of living.
182. Such is the goal of S. 2887, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
183. Hearing on S. 2887, supra note 13, at 4 (statement of Mr. Eiss). "One
would have to assume that the standards would be that [sic] applied by the
United States, since that reflects our collective assessment as to what effective
standards should be." Id at 3. Mr. Eiss points out not only that the USTR is ill-
equipped to make judgments as to proper levels of protection, but also the EPA
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Perhaps the greatest advantage of an international frame-
work for standardization'" of environmental protection is that
it is flexible enough to accommodate country-appropriate regu-
lations.1as "It is axiomatic that any policy will be only as success-
ful as the manner in which it is implemented." 8 Whether
based on command and control or market mechanisms, environ-
mental norms and standards "should be established at levels
which reflect.., the environmental characteristics and.., the
economic and social priorities of the place where the standards
are to apply.' 8 7 Variations between countries will directly af-
fect their cost structure and manner of meeting particular envi-
ronmental standards. 8 8
In addition to the natural environment's ability to absorb
man-made waste, the internal social organization will also help
determine the nature of an appropriate protection program.
The significance of the social organization cannot be overempha-
sized. Many environmental problems become political policy is-
suffers from the "immense complexities involved in judgments on the effective-
ness of pollution abatement standards of other countries." Id at 2.
184. Standardization contemplates a minimum level of environmental pro-
tection based on ideals of sustainable development. See icL
185. A unilaterally established standard cannot account for fundamental
variations in different countries' climate, topography, social, and economic
structure. If the importing country which promulgated the standard permitted
individual countries to deviate from that standard, it would be guilty of violat-
ing the MFN principle. However, where multilateral agreement is reached, ac-
commodations can be made for derogations from MFN. The argument could
also be made that the trade policy is no different, simply that the same require-
ments are met in a different way by different countries-such as using best
available technology as the standard as opposed to ambient environmental stan-
dards.
Moreover, the absence of multilateral agreement precludes unilateral ac-
tion proclaiming international consensus. Cf. Amato, supra note 13, at 95.
186. Policies and Mechanisms for Achieving Sustainable Development,
supra note 19, at 6.
187. Id. at 11. In its diagram of the "Mechanisms for Implementing Envi-
ronmental Policy" the UNCTAD Secretariat places initial focus on domestic
social organizations in determining effective measures of achieving sustainable
development. Social organizations are viewed as a link or "valve" between in-
formation, the political process, the legal/regulatory process and market mech-
anisms. Id. at 35.
188. Climate, geography, population density, and the like, all impact the ca-
pacity of the environment to assimilate pollutants. "There is of course no sys-
tematic relationship or coincidence between national political frontiers and the
highly specific determinants of environmental assimilative capacity." Walter,
supra note 3, at 31. Because of this great variation, a single set of unilaterally
created standards would be an inefficient means of protecting the environment
in many developed and developing countries.
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sues based on public outcry. 8 9 Concerned citizens can be
instrumental in demanding enforcement actions either through
public demands for administrative relief or through private legal
action.i 9' Nonetheless, ignorance of the true environmental
hazards of industrialization may keep the public quiet. Informa-
tion and technology transfers made possible by multilateral co-
operation will help educate the public and aid developing
countries in formulating appropriate environmental protection
strategies.
PART III. MULTILATERAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT
The multiple shortcomings of unilateral enforcement of
U.S. environmental standards mandate that an international en-
vironmental order be established to achieve long-term sustaina-
ble development. 19' The Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia (ESCWA), in response to U.N. requests for meth-
ods of preventing and monitoring coercive economic measures,
proposed inter alia a "strengthening of the GATT system"' 92
189. Policies and Mechanisms for Achieving Sustainable Developmen
supra note 19, at 7.
190. Particularly in common law countries, where there is greater access to
the legal system, private litigation or arbitration can be indispensable to the
success of any regulatory system. Id at 10.
191. Although its results may be problematic, a compromise between uni-
lateralism and multilateralism could be achieved by inserting a broad environ-
mental exception into the GATr. Such an exception could be amended to the
safeguard provisions of Article XIX or the general exception provisions of Arti-
cle XX, and would permit contracting parties to restrain trade to prevent harm
to the global environment. A broad environmental exception would entail "se-
rious risk for the trading system," however, and "would have to be subject to
clear multilateral disciplines." EC Commission, Trade and the Environment,
supra note 28, at 2. In other words, a multilateral framework for analyzing
environmental issues would still need to be established.
Even a limited exception to the GATr presents multiple questions which
parallel any other consideration of unilateral trade distorting actions. "Would
there be a need to define what constitutes a global environmental issue justify-
ing the application of trade restrictions? What standards of scientific evidence
would be required? What role to attribute to certain GATT principles such as:
MFN, national treatment, transparency, reasonableness of standards, less re-
strictive measure, compensation? Would the GATT be well equipped to assess
the environmental justification of the measures in dispute settlement proceed-
ings?" Id at 3.
192. Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion,
supra note 26, at 6. The ESCWA suggested that the GATT system could be
strengthened through improved monitoring and reporting on contracting par-
ties' trade policies, by way of a system that would bring coercive economic meas-
ures toward developing countries to the attention of each affected country.
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and cooperation among developed and developing countries to
reduce protectionism, barriers to trade and other restrictive
trade policies.193 The United States should promote these same
objectives as the foundation for its international environmental
and trade policy.194
Multilateralism is the accepted formula in international
trade relations, and an international institutional infrastructure
already exists for environmental protection.195 Multilateral en-
vironmental protection efforts can capitalize on the existing
legal, economic, and organizational foundation of international
trade and environmental institutions. A multilateral accord
would also avoid many of the problems of unilateral action by
associating itself with the GATT's legal and economic
legitimacy.
Meeting global environmental challenges through interna-
tional cooperation will be far more conducive to trade liberaliza-
tion and sustained development than unilateral action.196 The
EC Commission echoed this sentiment, noting that "[u]nilateral
trade restrictions would not normally be effective and raise seri-
ous equity issues, in particular as regards their impact on devel-
oping countries."'197 Although any link of trade access to
environmental standards will favor some nations over others, a
multilateral framework for the establishment of those standards
193. Id.
194. Although several of the proposed bills discussed in this Note include
provisions spurring the president to encourage GATT members to address envi-
ronmental issues, the presence in each bill of provisions calling for unilateral
action undermines the importance of any specific mention of multilateralism.
195. Russell Train, President of the World Wildlife Fund has advocated in-
creased congressional funding for international environmental programs such
as UNEP. Train suggests that the United States Congress is the key to fully
utilizing the international legal system. "Congress can measurably improve the
global environment, and best prepare the next generation of conventions and
treaties, by breathing new life into the international environmental instru-
ments and institutions that already exist." Environmental Agenda, supra note
14 at 206 (statement of Russell Train, President, World Wildlife Fund) (empha-
sis in original).
196. Accord, EC Commission, Trade and the Environment, supra note 28, at
2 ("trade restrictions to deal with global environmental issues to be allowed
only when such measures are adopted on the basis of multilateral conven-
tions"); INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at E-5 (submission of AAEI) (environ-
mentally based trade sanctions "should only be applied within the context of a
multilateral regime").
The Tuna Panel actually suggested that rather than proceeding through
unilateral trade disruptive means, the United States could have pursued its
objectives "through the negotiation of international cooperative agreements."
Trade, the Environment and the GAIT, supra note 50, at 2.
197. Trade, the Environment and the GATT, supra note 50, at 3.
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should be less objectionable to developing countries than unilat-
eral action. At the same time, establishment of such a frame-
work would increase environmental protection in developing
countries and level the playing field for international trade.198
The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer'9 is one example of a recent multilateral agree-
ment on the environment which attempts to diminish its possi-
ble adverse economic impact on developing countries. The
protocol recognizes that developing countries need flexibility in
phasing out ozone-depleting substances, and that resources
should be transferred to them to help defray the costs of compli-
ance.200 Thus, certain developing countries were permitted a
ten-year grace period before having to comply with the Proto-
col's control provisions so that they could reap the benefits of
certain controlled chemicals.2 0 ' In this multilateral context, im-
posing trade restrictions is justifiable to ensure compliance.20 2
With some modifications, GATT could do more to promote
environmental protection, even without restructuring. Article
XX need not be expanded to consider extraterritorial unilateral
action. A provision in Article XX explicitly recognizes environ-
mental protection as a fundamental moral goal.
One way to make GATT a better tool would be to amend
Article XX to incorporate environmental concerns into a provi-
sion modeled on the commodity agreements exception of Article
198. Cf. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at 4 ("multilat-
eral cooperation [reduces] the possibility that solutions are affected by differ-
ences in the economic and political strengths of the parties involved.").
199. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). The protocol's primary
objective is to limit and phase out the use of specific CFCs. The particular CFCs
to be controlled are listed in appendix A to the protocol. Each chemical is as-
signed a scientifically established "ozone depletion level" from which the con-
trol level for future reductions in use of the chemical are calculated. Id. at art.
2.
One year after the protocol entered into force, each signatory was to stop
importing controlled CFCs from countries not party to the protocol. Member
countries are to cease exports of controlled substances to nonsignatories as of
January 1, 1993. Id at art. 4.
The protocol also provides for a periodic review of the control measures in
light of current scientific, environmental and economic information to be con-
ducted every 4 years beginning in 1990. Id. at art. 6.
For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Koehler and Hajost, The Mon-
treal Protoco" A Dynamic Agreement for Protecting the Ozone Layer, 19
AMBIO (Apr. 1990).
200. Trade, the Environment and the GATT, supra note 50, at 3.
201. Montreal Protocol art. 5.
202. Trade, the Environment and the GATT, supra note 50, at 3.
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XX(h).203 The commodities exception permits non-arbitrary
measures undertaken in response to intergovernmental com-
modity agreements submitted to and not disapproved by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES.2° 4 This exception could be adapted
to environmental purposes by permitting countries to undertake
restrictions pursuant to obligations under certain intergovern-
mental environmental agreements.2 0 5 Such an explicit provision
would clarify the status of agreements, such as the Montreal
Protocol, and thereby curtail discriminatory unilateral enforce-
ment. A contracting party could take unilateral action to en-
force the terms of an environmental agreement only if the
CONTRACTING PARTIES were informed of the action and did
not disapprove.
A. MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UNDER
GATT AusPICES
Mutually agreed upon standards would make noncompli-
ance more difficult and would diminish the likelihood that sanc-
tions will be applied on political grounds.206 OECD members
have pledged their commitment to establishing, ratifying and
implementing international conventions on the protection and
conservation of the environment.20 7 Effective multilateral man-
agement of global environmental issues will better foster sus-
tainable development by avoiding the trade distorting effects of
unilateral measures. Implementing harmonized guiding princi-
ples will prevent recourse to such compensatory measures as im-
port levies and export rebates.20 8  Through international
cooperation, environmental protection standards can be tailored
to each country, yielding more efficient environmental protec-
tion while diminishing the unfair competitive advantage
203. See supra note 191 for additional options for reconciling multilateral-
ism and unilateralism.
204. GATT art. XX(h).
205. INT'L AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 6-8 (add'l views of comm'r Rohr).
206. Amato, supra note 110, at 106.
207. OECD Declaration on Environmental Policy, in OECD AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT, supra note 20, at 15.
208. Rubin, supra note 33, at 16. Unilateral efforts to combat the competi-
tive disadvantage faced by industries in environmentally conscious countries
are often countered by providing export rebates of pollution control taxes ap-
plied to domestic producers. This practice is clearly in contravention of the pol-
luter pays principle as the costs are no longer borne by the domestic producer
who chooses to export his products. As a result, the domestic environment is
adversely impacted without recognition of the costs domestically. Instead, the
costs of pollution control are borne by the exporter by way of environmentally
based taxes levied in the importing country.
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achieved by countries which would otherwise have lax control
measures.
If trade restrictions are to be a means to ensure environ-
mental protection, multilateralism must be respected. Multilat-
eral linkage of trade and the environment is a preferable system
in two respects: It is legally sound because it complies with
GATT, and it is economically sound because it promotes trade
while encouraging environmental protection. Multilateral
agreements will prevent retaliation and foster country-appropri-
ate standards from an economic and environmental perspective.
B. IMPLEMENTING A MULTILATERAL SYSTEM
Accepting multilateralism over unilateralism is only the
first step in achieving global environmental protection. The
more vexing issue is how to implement an enforceable multilat-
eral program. The most crucial element of any global program
is the method of enforcement. A significant shortcoming of in-
ternational law is that if a violation has no pecuniary conse-
quences, states have a limited incentive to comply.2° 9 In any
multilateral agreement, a free-rider can reap substantial bene-
fits from cheating while others abide by the agreement. "The
need to avoid 'free-riders' is the main argument for applying
trade restrictions to those countries which do not assume com-
mitments to tackle a global environmental challenge. 210 Be-
cause GATT provides a basis for enforcement, through
withdrawal of trade concessions, it is imperative that any multi-
lateral accord on environmental protection be adopted within
the GATT framework.211
Taking coercive group action to achieve a globally recog-
209. Nagendra Singh, Foreword to EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, xv (1987) [hereinaf-
ter WCED]. "[I]nadequate political commitment to any regime of regulation
other than one based on reciprocal advantage . . ." results in a genre where
regulation is easily framed, but nearly impossible to enforce.
210. EC Commission, Trade and the Environment, supra note 28, at 3.
211. The WCED, supra note 209, adopted "Elements for a Draft Convention
on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development," which is intended
to serve as a basis for establishing an International Convention on Environmen-
tal Protection and a conduit for bringing existing international agreements into
an enforceable framework. The WCED's draft proposals rely on commitment
of the parties to peaceful dispute settlement through arbitration or mediation
subject to time limitations, after which the parties would submit to binding judi-
cial decision in the International Court of Justice. Though the Commission
points out the inadequacies of a legal system which relies on voluntary compli-
ance of the parties, it fails to suggest anything more compelling than agreement
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nized goal is far less objectionable than unilateral domination of
the developing world. A concerted, multifaceted program will
be the most effective weapon against the free-rider problem.
Such an effort will require institutions to aid in setting appropri-
ate standards, monitoring compliance, transferring information
and disciplining breaches.21 2 Because GATT has an established
framework to perform all of these functions, a multilateral ac-
cord relating trade and the environment would fit as an appro-
priate part of the GATT structure.213
Conclusion
The current trend in the United States Congress toward ef-
fectuating U.S. environmental policy goals through unilateral
restrictive trade practices is ill-advised. These unilateral meas-
ures violate GATT and are both inefficient and ineffective as a
means to protect the global environment. International cooper-
ation on environmental protection would better serve the envi-
ronment and would curtail the competitive disadvantage of
industries in countries with strict environmental protection
laws.
The U.S. Congress should redirect its efforts from pursuing
unilateral action to establishing a multilateral forum for the dis-
cussion of trade and the environment. As a basis for this forum,
Congress should seek a multilateral agreement with enforceable
provisions. This agreement should be adapted to fit within the
framework of GATT.
to be bound by the ICJ. A system of reciprocal advantage and disadvantage
should be far more effective at inducing compliance.
212. "The principal obstacles to effective rule enforcement are, on the one
hand, an inability to detect violations and violators and, on the other hand, the
lack of authority or willingness to apply sanctions strong enough to deter viola-
tors." DAHLBERG, supra note 1, at 91. Given sufficient collaborative action, it is
possible to put pressure on a free rider to comply with collectively established
rules and norms. At the international level, trade sanctions may bring uncoop-
erative states into compliance. Id.
213. The problem of the environment has many aspects and will continue to
be a concern of several organizations. Cooperation among these organizations,
such as the OECD and the U.N. Environmental Programme would improve
safeguarding of the environment. Rubin, supra note 33, at 18. The relationship
of trade and the environment, however, has grown sufficiently troublesome and
needs to be addressed in its own forum. The GATT provides the logical forum
for those discussions.
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